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This paper shows that industry choices of entrepreneurs are 
determined by their social networks. The separation of residential and 
business addresses helps us establish the causality, because we can safely 
argue that residential addresses determine social networks but do not 
directly affect industry choices.  
In a large cross-section of London neighborhoods (average area: one 
squared-mile), we show that new generation of entrepreneurs are more 
likely to enter industries overrepresented by their residential neighbors. 
We further show that industry composition of a neighborhood is more 
persistent when social interactions are more intensive and of higher 
quality, as proxied by higher ethnic homogeneity, more sociable housing 
structures, or higher entrepreneurial population density. The effect is also 
stronger in industries that require more informational interactions, as 
proxied by greater geographic agglomeration of entrepreneurs.  
The median home-business distances in our sample is nearly six 
kilometers, thus the persistence of a neighborhood’s industry 
specialization is unlikely to be driven by unobservable common product 
market conditions. We also control for industry specialization at borough 
level (each borough contains around 20 neighborhoods), to further remove 
the effects of unobservable factors. Finally, we also use various sub-groups 
of entrepreneurs to test for a series of alternative hypotheses, and we do 
not find support for them.  
We do not find failure rates to be significantly different for 
entrepreneurs who follow their neighbors’ popular choices. Overall, the 
results suggest that entry of new entrepreneurs tend to reinforce 
agglomeration, while exits do not reverse it. These evidences (weakly) 
lend support to the existence of agglomeration economies. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
In London, entrepreneurs from certain neighborhoods dominate certain industries 
for a long period of time. For instance, a neighborhood called Garden Suburb supply 
disproportionate number of entrepreneurs in real estate businesses. Why is it so? Given 
convenient mobility within London and low capital requirement in service sector, why 
should neighbors and neighborhoods matter? Do “trade secretes” spread among neighbors 
through social interactions? We suspect that social interactions create such industry 
agglomeration.  
Individuals are not considered as isolated entities but rather as being part of 
networks of friends, relatives, neighbors, colleagues, that jointly provide cultural norms, 
economic opportunities, information flows, social sanctions and so on (Topa, 2001). As 
stated by Shiller (2000):  “A fundamental observation about human society is that 
people who communicate regularly with one another think similarly”.  We suspect that 
such social interactions matter not only when people pick their stocks, but also when 
people make entrepreneurial decisions regarding which industries to enter. Residents 
living a same neighborhood are more likely to social with one another, and they are thus 
more likely to be familiar with what one another are working on.  
There are two strands of literature both of which are compatible with such a 
prediction. First, human beings have intrinsic desires to behave like certain others. 
Hamilton (2000) and Moskovitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) both show that 
entrepreneurial decisions can be motivated by non-pecuniary benefits, which are mainly 
acquired through social interactions. Social interactions may create social norms that 
make certain industries more respectful, associated with social status, esteem, and 
prestige and the like  in some neighborhoods (Cole et al. 1992 and Bernheim 1994). An 
individual, when assessing alternative behavioral choices, will find a given behavior 
relatively more desirable if others have previously behaved or are currently behaving in 
the same way. For instance, Giannetti and Simonov (2004) show that  in social groups   2
where entrepreneurship is more widespread individuals are more likely to become 
entrepreneurs, even though their entrepreneurial profits are lower. This suggests that 
social norms create non-pecuniary benefits from entrepreneurial activities.   
Second, agglomeration economy literature can also make the same empirical 
predictions that entrepreneurs are more likely to enter industries in which their 
residential neighbors are historically overrepresented. Individuals may learn how to run a 
business by observing their neighbors. Geographic economists have shown that easy flow 
of ideas explain why industries cluster into close quarters. Local accumulations of 
knowledge, enhanced by long-term relationships and histories of interactions, will create 
a stock of “local trade secrets” and informational externalities that benefit local firms 
and entrepreneurs.  On the empirical side, a vast and growing literature
1 has attempted 
to provide a statistical estimate of the magnitude of local interactions and neighborhood 
effects.  
1.2. Empirical Strategy and Summary of Findings 
Manski (2000, pp. 128) (also known as “the Manski critique”) argues that 
unobservable factors could create correlation of behaviors among members of a same 
social group, absent social interactions. This creates difficulty for empirical research. To 
address this problem, we use residential addresses of entrepreneurs to identify social 
networks. A residential address determines an entrepreneur’s social network, but does 
not directly affect his choice of industry, which is more likely to be affected by the 
business location.   Thus residential addresses become valid instrumental variables for 
the availability of social contacts as well as the contacts’ industry backgrounds. 
                                                 
1 There are two sorts of externalities, as found by previous literature. The Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) 
externality concerns knowledge spillover between firms within an same industry. A good example would 
be the Silicon Valley, where IT firms benefit from locating close to each other. Jacobs (1969), unlike MAR, 
believes that the  most important knowledge transfers come from outside the core industry. He believes 
that, variety and diversity of geographically proximate industries rather than geographical specialization 
promote innovation and growth.Using city-industry data, Glaeser et al . (1992) show that local competition 
and urban variety , but not regional specialization, encourage employment growth in industries. Their 
evidences suggest that important knowledge spillovers might occur between rather than within industries, 
consistent with the theories  of Jacobs. Henderson et al. (1995) however show that both MAR externalities 
and Jacobs externalities can affect industry growth positively. Jencks and Mayer (1990), Ioannides and 
Loury (2004) and Brock and Durlauf (2001) give excellent surveys of the empirical literature on 
agglomeration economy.   3
We implement our tests using government records of residential addresses of 
London entrepreneurs. The administrative nature of the data set allows us to track down 
the detailed location and industry background of virtually everyone in London. Our 
results are based on a cross-section of neighborhood-industry pairs. We find that 
entrepreneurs are more likely to enter industries in which their residential neighbors are 
historically over-represented. We also find that the effect is stronger in neighborhoods 
with more intensive social interactions, and in industries with higher agglomeration of 
entrepreneurs. This provides an extra level of identification. The effects we find are not 
likely to be driven by unobservable product market conditions (e.g., demand growth) 
which are supposed to be determined by business addresses. The reasons are as follows. 
First, we are examining an entrepreneur’s residential address rather than his 
business address, and these two addresses are usually distant away from each other. 
With the gazetteer dataset provided by the Royal Post, we find that, in our sample, the 
median distance between an entrepreneur’s residential and business addresses is 5.45 
kilometers, which is about one quarter of the radius of Greater London. More than 80 % 
of entrepreneurs have their businesses operated outside the neighborhoods where they 
reside, and nearly 70% outside the borough they reside.  Finally, entrepreneurs from a 
same residential neighborhood do not usually locate their businesses close to one 
another
2. In fact, we also run regressions based on sub-samples excluding entrepreneurs 
who operate their businesses in their own residential neighborhoods or boroughs, and our 
results remain robust.  For these reasons, we argue that residential addresses only affect 
social interactions, but do not directly affect industry choices.  
Second, in all of our regressions, we also control for industry specialization at 
borough level (each of which contains around 20 neighborhoods). This practice further 
                                                 
2 A median neighborhood (in terms of the number of neighborhood where its residents have business 
presence) has businesses operated in 104 other neighborhoods in London, which by the way are not 
concentrated in a particular part of London but can be found in 24 boroughs (a higher level of geographic 
unit than neighborhood) dispersed around London. For this same neighborhood, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (at neighborhood level) for the geographic concentration of businesses belonging to its residents is 
1288, which is usually not considered as concentrated. This suggests that entrepreneurs of a neighborhood 
venture everywhere in London and do not cluster in a particular place (i.e. , this is not that sort of “China 
Town” story), and they are thus supposed not to share common product market factors.   4
takes care of the omitted variable problems, because we are actually examining the 
within-borough variations across neighborhoods, which are mostly driven by difference in 
circles of social interactions rather than in product markets.  Positive sorting is unlikely 
to happen in this context, as it is unlikely that entrepreneurs move to certain 
neighborhoods in order to find industry peers. Finally, we can think of very few 
residential neighborhood characteristics that can determine which neighborhoods must 
do which industries.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.3, we briefly 
review literature in relation to social interactions and individual choices. In Section 2, we 
explain how we construct the data set and how we create industry specialization indices 
for a large cross-section of neighborhood-industry pairs. In Section 3, we introduce the 
empirical strategy. In Section 4, we report how new entrepreneurs’ industry choices are 
influenced by the established entrepreneurs in their own residential neighborhoods. In 
Section 5, we attempt to identify the channels through which established entrepreneurs 
influence new entrepreneurs. In Section 6, we test for the agglomeration economy 
hypothesis.  We conclude in Section 7. 
1. 3. Related Literature 
Social interaction’s impacts on individual choices are also documented in other 
lines of literature, mainly in relation to occupational choice and portfolio choice, among 
many others.  Here I mainly review papers in relation to multiple choices, but some 
papers studying binary choices decisions are also covered when necessary.  
The most relevant is on employees’ occupational choices. Labor economics 
literature shows that workers’ occupational choices are positively affected by their 
neighbors
3. Bayer et al. (2004) find that neighbors in a same neighborhood block are 50% 
more likely to work in a same place, which indicates some sorts of information sharing 
                                                 
3 Corcoran (1980), Montgomery (1991) and Granovertter  (1995)  show  that from 24% to 74% of 
Americans found their jobs through friends, neighbors, and relatives. Bentolila et al. (2004) argue that 
people use personal contacts as referrals to find jobs, ending up working in the same occupations as their 
friends, but this usually create mismatch between occupations and their comparative productive advantage, 
and thus resulting in lower aggregate productivity.   5
among neighbors in the job searching process. Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002) find that 
Dartmouth students’ occupational choice are heavily influenced by their randomly 
assigned freshmen roommates, hallmates, and dormmates.  Bertrand et al. (2000) find 
that members of high welfare-using language groups are more likely to claim benefits if 
living in neighborhoods with many people speaking the same languages. They interpret 
this as a social interaction effect. 
Literature on the portfolio choices of investors also suggests some sorts of “word-
of-mouth” effects. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2003) find that a mutual fund manager is 
more likely to buy (or sell) a particular stock in any quarter if other managers in the 
same city are buying (or selling) that same stock. Gamble (2003) finds similar effects 
among individual investors. Lei and Seasholes (2004) find that purchases and sales are 
highly correlated when we divide retail investors geographically.  
There are applications in other fields as well. In relation to social interaction’s 
effects on consumption behavior, Grinblatt et al. (2004) show that consumers’ purchase 
of automobiles are strongly influenced by the purchases of his neighbors, particularly 
those who are geographically most proximate. They also show that the choices on models 
of automobiles are also affected by neighbors’ choices.  In relation to  social activities, 
Sacerdote (2001) find that Dartmouth roommates and dormmates are more likely to join 
the same fraternities or sororities. Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) show that 
criminal behaviors are strongly shaped by peer groups.  
 
2. Construction of Data Set and Industry Specialization Index 
2.1. Entrepreneurs 
Our data set is based on administrative record of United Kingdom’s incorporated 
companies. Companies Act of U.K. requires that every limited liability company or 
limited partnership must report to the Registrar of Companies House (the registration 
authority) within 14 days after it makes changes to its board of directors, and failing to   6
do so will automatically result in penalties
4. Thus we are able to collect information on 
almost the whole universe of directors for U.K. limited liability companies and limited 
partnerships for the past ten years.  
We define entrepreneurs as those who are directors of limited liability companies 
registered in UK (including public and private companies).  We do not have data for 
entrepreneurs who register as sole traders or unlimited partnerships. This exclusion 
however is irrelevant to our results because our analysis do not rely on precise 
measurement of total number of entrepreneurs. One assumption we however need to 
make is that preference for incorporation (as opposed to other legal forms) is industry-
specific or neighborhood-specific but not industry-neighborhood-pair –specific (that it is 
more popular to incorporate as limited companies in some industries, or some 
neighborhoods, but not some industry-neighborhood pairs). This assumption being met, 
we can measure a neighborhood’s industry specialization without data on entrepreneurs 
who register as sole traders or partners. Furthermore, given the low cost of incorporation 
in U.K., people undertaking truly entrepreneurial ventures are most likely to have 
registered as limited liability companies to take advantage of the limited liability 
protection.  
Entrepreneurs in our sample are not likely to be those kind of non-
entrepreneurial directors we see in big corporations who only meet several times a year 
for major decisions, as our sample are overwhelmed by small and micro enterprises
5 and 
presumably their directors personally should operate the businesses on a daily basis. 
Moreover, the turnover of directors is low (80% of directors joined within half a year 
since the companies’ incorporations), which suggests that most directors follow the 
                                                 
4 The Companies House actively inform entrepreneurs on her web site that “Being Late is a Criminal 
Offence”, see www.companyhouse.gov.uk) . Certainly there are some companies which fail to update their 
information promptly. This however has minimal effects, because we do not see wide-spread incentives for 
which people would systematically provide false information on the identity of their directors. Thus we 
believe that these data are quite reliable (compared to accounting information). 
5 According to UK Inland Revenue Department’s definition (43 Million GBP in total asset as a cut-off 
point),  98.2% of the companies in our sample are SMEs. As a matter of fact, among the SMEs, most are 
micro enterprises.   7
ventures from the beginning and can be safely defined as entrepreneurs. Finally, outside 
directors are also able to provide information to their residential neighbors.  
An entrepreneur is included in our sample if he meets the following two 
conditions: (1) His company is registered and/or operated in Greater London; (2) He 
resides in Greater London as well. By setting such restrictions, our results are cleaner as 
the location decisions are less likely to be affected by transportation frictions or local 
product market conditions. Greater London (the core of London Metropolitan Area) is a 
single Travel-To-Work area with extensive and convenient public transportation 
network, such that it is doable to commute within the area on a daily basis without 
substantial costs, and thus most people who work in this area also live in this area.   
2.2 Neighborhoods 
Although people can travel conveniently in London, we believe that people still 
interact more with neighbors in the same neighborhoods where they live. Our definition 
of a neighborhood is the “electoral ward” in UK. Ward is the lowest level of geographic 
and political unit for which representatives to local councils can be elected. In densely 
populated area such as London, each ward has a population of around 10,000, which is 
much smaller than electoral wards in the United States. In U.K. a ward is also 
unofficially called a community or a neighborhood, and we will use the name 
“neighborhood” throughout our paper, for convenience of presentation. There are more 
than 600 such neighborhoods in Greater London. A map of Greater London, with 
boundaries of boroughs and electoral wards is shown in Figure 1.  
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
The average area of a neighborhood is less than one square mile. The underlying 
assumption of our paper is that the development and maintenance of social contacts is 
limited to some extent by physical distance, and individuals are more likely to interact 
with people who live physically close. This is strongly supported by previous findings, 
which show that most social interactions happen within a one square mile area
6.  
                                                 
6 Wellman (1996) using Toronto resident data finds that about 38% of yearly active contacts in all social 
networks take place between pairs of agents who live less than one mile apart. In a Detroit study, Connerly   8
Furthermore, for political reasons, the boundaries of electoral wards are 
intentionally drawn in a way that residents within an electoral ward level generally share 
similar social-economic background as well as neighborhood identities, and are affected 
by the same set of public service (e.g., public schools)
7. Thus, residents living in the 
same ward are more likely to meet, social, associate, and bond.  
Thus, we sort entrepreneurs into their neighborhoods by using the a look-up 
table provided by the Census Dissemination Unit (CDU) which use electoral wards 
defined right before 2001 census, which is current with our base year 2000.  
2.3. Industries 
After matching entrepreneurs’ home address with neighborhoods, we also match 
their industries with United Kingdom Standard Industrial Classification of Economic 
Activities (1992) codes.  UKSIC codes are used because they are grouped according to 
the “similarity in the process used to produce goods or services”, and thus the exchange 
of information and knowledge are presumably more valuable for entrepreneurs in the 
same industry divisions.  We use two-digit SIC industry divisions. Three-digit and four-
digit SIC industries may be distinct on the demand side, but less distinct in the 
operation side. Within a two-digit industry, knowledge and “trade secrets” are generally 
transferable. Furthermore, moving to a more finely disaggregated level creates 
substantial difficulties with small number of entrepreneurs in each neighborhood-
industry pair.  
                                                                                                                                                 
(1985) finds that 41% of the respondent had at least one third of their Detroit friends residing within one 
mile.  Guest and Lee (1983) and Hunter (1974), using Seattle and Chicago data respectively, find that 
nearly half of the respondents say they have majority of their friends living in the same community (which 
actually have similar size as the electoral ward we use in this paper). Conley and Topa (2002) using 
Chicago data find that unemployment rates across census tract are weak, and suggest that most social 
interactions happen within census tracts (which correspond to our electoral wards). Rosenthal and Strange 
(2005) find that the amount of local employment in an entrepreneur’s own industry has positive effects on 
births of new ventures in this industry, but this effect beyond one mile is an order of magnitude smaller 
than the effect of the more immediate environment. The average population of an electoral ward is 10,000 
residents, which is also commonly accepted as the size of neighborhood/community, e.g., Project on 
Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) documented by Sampson, Raudenbush and 
Earls (2003). Durlauf (2003) provides a good survey of the economics literature on neighborhood effects. 
7 The criteria and guidelines for drawing neighborhood boundaries can be found on the website of U.K. 
government’s Boundary Committee (www.boundarycommittee.org.uk).   9
In Table 1, we present the top twenty industries in London, in terms of their 
shares of entrepreneurs in London. Virtually all of them are service industries. Only 
“manufacturing of furniture and manufacturing not elsewhere classified”
8 narrowly makes 
into top twenty. The top twenty industries however already host 95% of London’s 
entrepreneurs. Entry requirements are low for these industries. GBP 20,000 -30,000 of 
starting total asset is the norm for them, except “Real Estate Activities” industry which 
requires some GBP 150,000. This explains why they are so popular in terms of number. 
This also makes our later results more convincing, because financial constraints  are not 
of secondary importance for entrepreneurs’ industry choices. The top five industries in 
year 2000 is other businesses services, real estate activities,  residents property 
management, computer and related activities,  and other services.  The industry 
composition of London entrepreneurs is quite stable. Comparing the industry 
composition of established entrepreneurs in year 2000 and that of the new entrants in 
the next four years, we find that the ranking of industry share barely changed.  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
Arguably, an SIC industry division whose name starts by “Other....” (e.g., “Other 
Business Activities” and “Other service activities”) or whose name includes “not else 
classified” (e.g., “Manufacturing of Furniture and Manufacturing Not Else Classified” ) 
are less homogenous. This could affect our results. However, the results in this paper do 
not rely on inclusion or exclusion of these industries.  As a matter of fact, we also 
estimate the model separately for each of the major industries, and find that our results 
are not driven by any particular ones.  
 
2.4. A Neighborhood’s Industry Specialization 
                                                 
8 In this case, it is certainly inappropriate to define a collection of “not else classified” manufacturing 
businesses as a homogenous industry. Nevertheless, in our analysis, this group happens to be the only 
manufacturing “industry” in the top twenty industries, thus the entry into this two-digit SIC industry 
sufficiently  proxy for an industry choice of  manufacturing as opposed to service. For that matter, this 
group of businesses is sharply distinct from the other industries, and in this special case we can accept it as 
a homogenous group. Finally, our results are not driven by this particular industry.   10
Following Glaeser et al. (1992), with the following formula we create “industry 
specialization (concentration) index” for each neighborhood-industry pair (i.e., industry i 
in neighborhood n), where i denotes industry and n denotes neighborhood. “# 
Entrepreneurs” is short for “Number of Entrepreneurs” 
London in    urs Entreprene   #   Total  /   urs Entreprene   #
urs Entreprene   #   /   urs Entreprene   #
_
n
i n   i,
, = n i Index tion Specializa  
This index is independent of the geographic distribution of total entrepreneur 
population, which are already controlled for by the denominator of the above formula. 
Very intuitively, index values greater than one indicate relative concentration/over-
representation of industry i in neighborhood n.  
Using the formula mentioned above, for a cross-section of neighborhood-industry 
pairs, we create industry specialization indices for two groups of entrepreneurs 
respectively: (1) Old generation of established entrepreneurs on our base date January 1, 
2000; (2) New generation of entrepreneurs who entered businesses in the next four-year 
period between January 2, 2000 and January 1, 2004.  For established entrepreneurs, we 
also create the specialization index based on specializations at borough level. 
Established entrepreneurs are defined as current directors of active companies on 
the date of January 1, 2000.  Constrained by data availability (company records which 
have not been active for the past five years are routinely removed from the data set
9), 
year 2000 is the best choice if we want to obtain a complete snapshot of London 
entrepreneurs active at a certain point in time.  
We choose to end our investigation in 2004 because for companies incorporated 
in most recent years UKSIC codes have not yet been assigned for them. We exclude 
entrepreneurs who enter businesses by joining companies incorporated before January 1, 
                                                 
9 If a company can be located in the database, it is almost certain that it was still alive around year 2000. On 
the one hand, choosing earlier years would result in incomplete coverage, as those which ceased trading in 
2000 (but still active before that) were dropped from the database already. On the other hand, choosing 
companies incorporated in later years would create another problem that we will not be able to identify 
whether a firm was active or not at a certain point in time, as the database only gives information on 
whether a company is active or not as of now (thus we may risk including directors for dead companies as 
active entrepreneurs).   11
2000, as that would create spurious correlation in our regressions (since replacement 
directors are more likely to be drawn from the same neighborhoods).  
During the period, the number of entrepreneurial entries is unprecedented. The 
number of new entrepreneurs entering businesses in this merely four-year period is 
already about half of the number of existing ones in year 2000. This exogenous shock to 
the equilibrium provides us with a good opportunity to investigate the transition 
dynamics. The surge of entrepreneurship in U.K. is argued to be the result of rising 
prices of real estates, which can be used as collaterals to borrow against. Bank of 
England states in its February 2004 inflation report that: “self-employment may simply 
be more feasible than in the past, as sharp rises in house prices have increased the 
collateral at workers’ disposal and so reduced the credit constraints they face.” In the 
four-year period 2000-2004 we study, the house price in Greater London and Outer 
Metropolitan Area appreciated by more than 50%, according to the house index 
provided by Nationwide Co. The other favorable factors that contribute to the rise of 
entrepreneurship includes among others the economic booms, loose monetary polices, tax 
reform in 2002, and probably the drift of social norms toward entrepreneurship.  We will 
also show later that the major tax reform in 2002 is not creating spurious correlation in 
our regressions.  
2.5. Geography of London Entrepreneurs 
Since we are using a new data set, it may be helpful to present a simple 
description of the data.  
Entrepreneurs are not evenly distributed in London. Neighborhoods vary in terms 
of entrepreneurship. In Figure 2, we display a histogram of entrepreneurial densities in a 
cross section of neighborhoods. We measure entrepreneurial density of a neighborhood by 
the percentage of entrepreneurs in working age population. The median value of 
entrepreneurial densities is 3.6%, but we also have quite a few extremely entrepreneurial 
neighborhoods with more than 30% of their working age residents running their own 
businesses. We would not exploit this dimension of variation to examine why some   12
neighborhoods are more entrepreneurial because it is very difficult to address the 
omitted variables problems.   
[insert Figure 2 about here] 
Neighborhoods in our sample also vary greatly in their industry specializations. 
“Industry specialization” is defined on a relative term.  A neighborhood will be defined 
as a specialist of industry X if this neighborhood has disproportionate share of 
entrepreneurs in industry X.  In Figure 3, we present a histogram of “industry 
specialization index” for a cross-section of neighborhood-industry pairs. In Table 2, we 
also display the specialist industries by each of the top thirty most entrepreneurial 
London neighborhoods.  For each neighborhood we only present its top three specialist 
industries. We notice that most of these neighborhoods specialize in real estate and 
financial intermediation activities, which is not surprising as they demand a lot of social 
interactions. Later we also show that these two industries are among the most 
geographically agglomerated in terms of entrepreneurs’ residential addresses, and the 
persistence of agglomeration is stronger in these industries. This correlation may suggest 
to us the reason why entrepreneurs of certain industries crowd into a small number of 
neighborhoods, while doing so certainly drive up real estate prices.  
[insert Table 2 and Figure 3 about here] 
Most entrepreneurs start their business outside their own residential 
neighborhoods. In Table 1, we also present for each of the top twenty industries the 
percentage of entrepreneurs operating businesses in their own residential neighborhoods, 
as well as the median distance between their homes and their business sites.  For the 
whole population of entrepreneurs, only 20% of them locate their businesses in their own 
residential neighborhoods, and the median distance between their homes and business 
sites is nearly six kilometers. There are some industries where the two addresses are 
relatively closer, such as residential management industry and computer industry, which 
is not surprising considering the way these industries are operated.  
 
3. Empirical Strategy   13
In this paper, we begin by establishing a robust and positive correlation between 
industry choices of old and new generations of neighbors. We then proceed through a 
series of steps to rule out alternative hypotheses and to provide stronger evidences in 
favor of the social interaction story. In this section, I introduce how the correlation is 
established. 
Like most of the existing literature (among others, Giannetti and Simonov 2004, 
Betrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan 2000), we assume that social network are defined by 
administrative boundaries (in our case neighborhood boundary) and can thus test only 
indirectly how social interactions operate. For this reason, we base our analysis on a 
cross-section of neighborhood-industry pairs instead of letting social network to vary 
across every individual. I establish the correlation by testing whether, in a neighborhood, 
industry backgrounds of old generation of entrepreneurs in year 2000 affect industry 
choices of new entrepreneurs who start their businesses in the next four-year period. We 
estimate a model as specified below
10, with the dependent variable reflecting the 
aggregate choices of a neighborhood’s new generations. Used as explanatory variables are 
industry specializations of old generation of entrepreneurs in year 2000, which proxy for 
the “quality” of these new entrepreneurs’ social network (i.e., for a would-be entrepreneur 
residing in neighborhood A, how likely it is for him to meet a neighbor with 
entrepreneurial background in  industry I). Later we will also let the correlation to vary 
across neighborhoods and industries to provide more direct evidence that social 
interactions are driving the correlation.  
 
Specialization Index (at neighborhood level,  base on new entrepreneurs)  
=  β1 [ Specialization Index (at neighborhood level, based on old entrepreneurs ]  + 
β2 [Specialization Index (at borough level, based on old entrepreneurs] + Constant 
 
                                                 
10 There are certainly alternative ways to test for our hypothesis. For instance, Brock and Durlauf (2003) 
already develop an econometric method to estimate multinomial choice with social interactions. Their 
complicated method however is not necessary in our context, where we have separation of home and 
business addresses, as well as variation of social interactions across neighborhoods   14
We estimate the model with Tobit regressions (truncated at zero) instead of 
OLS, because for substantial number of neighborhood-industry pairs we observe zero 
values (i.e., absence of industry i in neighborhood c). In our baseline sample of 600 
neighborhoods by 20 industries, 15% of the observations are zero (and even higher in 
other samples).  
We also run regressions separately for each of the individual industries, to make 
sure that our results are not driven by an individual or a sub-group of industries. We 
also use bootstrapping technique to address the concern that industry specialization 
index within a neighborhood is mechanically correlated. Finally, neighborhood- or 
industry-specific dummies are not necessary, as by construction the “industry 
specialization index” does not contain any neighborhood- or industry-specific 
components.  
A statistically an economically significant β1 would indicate the persistence of 
industry specialization over time. We also let β1 to vary across neighborhoods or 
industries in order to detect the detailed channels through which social interactions 
impact entrepreneurs’ industry choices.  Theoretically, such effects should be stronger in 
neighborhoods with more scope for social interactions, as well as in industries more 
dependent on social interactions.  
The specification is arguably very parsimonious. Undoubtedly, industry choice is 
also influenced by many other factors. However, so long as these unobservable factors 
are orthogonal to entrepreneurs’ residential choices, we are always able to obtain 
unbiased estimates of the social interaction effects. Most importantly, we argue that our 
null hypothesis of “entrepreneurs from a same neighborhood make their industry choices 
independently” is very powerful, and it is hard to reject it unless there exist some sorts of 
information interactions among neighbors.  Below we will explain it in details. 
Arguably, residential addresses should determine network of social interactions, 
but do not directly affect industry choices. First, entrepreneurs are facing a bigger 
market than their own neighborhoods, and most of them operate their businesses far   15
enough away from where they reside and should not be affected by some unobservable 
common product market factors. Second, our outcome variables are based on industry 
choices of new generation of entrepreneurs. Unlike occupational choices of employees, 
there are no path-dependences (In contrast, employees rarely change occupations). 
Third, our basic unit of analysis is neighborhood-industry pair, for which we can think of 
very few residential area characteristics such as life style that can potentially affect the 
outcome variables in such a systematic way (i.e., which neighborhoods must do which 
industries), although certain life style may increase the density of entrepreneurial 
activities at aggregate level.  
Most importantly, we also control for industry specializations at borough level.  
Borough is the higher level of political/geographic unit than neighborhood. London is 
composed of 33 boroughs (including City of London and City of Westminster). There are 
around 20 neighborhoods within each borough. It is more convenient for people to travel 
within a borough (because of shorter distances) than travel across boroughs in London, 
thus entrepreneurs in the same borough may face similar product market conditions as 
well as common circle of social interactions. Controlling for industry specializations at 
borough level further restrict the scope for omitted variable problems, because the 
coefficients on industry specialization index (at neighborhood level) will now only catch 
the within-borough cross-neighborhood variations, which are not likely to be driven by 
common market factors. 
     
4. Persistence of Neighborhoods’ Industry Specializations 
4.1. Is industry composition of a neighborhood persistent over time?  
In Table 3 and Table 4, we report the results based on our basic regressions. We 
are interested in the signs of the coefficients on the “industry specialization index” at 
neighborhood level. If this coefficient turns out to be significantly positive, it indicates 
that sectoral composition of a residential neighborhood is very persistent over time, and 
that entrepreneurs are more likely to start businesses in industries where their neighbors 
are overrepresented.    16
[insert Table 3 and Table 4 about here] 
Of the 633 neighborhoods on which we have data, we the 33 least entrepreneurial 
ones, which account for less than 1% of all entrepreneurs in our sample
11. Each of these 
neighborhoods has on average only fifty entrepreneurs (in all industries), and it is 
difficult to measure industry specialization with such small number of entrepreneurs (we 
will explain in more details below). In Table 3, readers can compare the regressions 
results in Row (1) which includes all 633 neighborhoods, and Row (2) which exclude the 
33 least entrepreneurial ones. Two results are quantitatively similar. Later in Section 5 
we also show that social interactions among entrepreneurial are the weaker in less 
entrepreneurial neighborhoods.  
In the above regressions, we run regressions by pooling all industries together, 
while in Table 4, we also run regressions separately for each industries and report results 
of the top thirty industries.  For regressions which pool all industries, we find that the 
coefficients of interest are highly significant and positive, which supports the presence of 
social interaction peer effects. The pseudo R
2 however are close to zero, which suggests 
that log-likelihoods for the full-model and the constant-only model are almost the same. 
This is not surprising after we examine the industry-by-industry regressions in Table 4, 
where we find that the persistence of a neighborhood’s sectoral composition is mainly 
driven by  the top twenty industries, which however already account for 95% of the 
entrepreneurial population.  This suggests that the low explanatory power is caused by 
the outliers. The industry-by-industry regressions also address another concern: some 
industries may require certain endowment that only residents of certain neighborhoods 
possess, and as a result entrepreneurs of certain industries persistently come from certain 
neighborhoods.  Nevertheless, it is very hard to argue that this is true for all of the 
twenty-three industries where we find very significant persistence of industry 
specializations. 
                                                 
11 The choice of 600 as a cut-off point is certainly arbitrary, but our results are not affected by alternative 
choices. We choose 600 simply because (1) it is a round number; (2) we do not want to drop too many 
observations, but it is equally unwise not to drop those very obvious outliers.    17
London heavily specializes in a small group of industries. Though theoretically 
entrepreneurs have sixty SIC industries to choose from, nearly 95% of the entrepreneurs 
are in the top twenty industries, and the top thirty industries already account for more 
than 98% of the entrepreneurs. Smaller industries outside top thirty attract so few 
entrepreneurs per industry (not enough for one entrepreneur in each neighborhood, let 
alone forming a social network) that specialization index will mechanically contain a lot 
of measurement errors. Ellison and Glaeser (1997)’s “Dartboard” theory suggests that 
simply by random chances small industries can be agglomerated geographically. For 
instance, for an industry with only 300 entrepreneurs in London, simple by random 
chance it is going to be agglomerated geographically because you can not divide one 
person into two and assign half to each neighborhood. This generates large measurement 
errors. 
In Row (3) and Row (4) of Table 3, we report the regression results based on top 
thirty and top twenty industries respectively and readers can compare the results.  The 
restriction to top twenty industries in analysis has minimal costs of sample selection (we 
already include 95% of the entrepreneurs) while minimize the influences of outliers’ 
measurement errors.  Bertrand et al. (2000) also adopt such a censoring by excluding 
languages spoken by less than 2000 people in their sample. The results in Row (5) are 
based on the “20 industries by 600 neighborhoods” sample. Using full sample would not 
change our results, though reducing the size of pseudo R
2.  Unless otherwise indicated, 
the results presented later are based on this main sample
12.  
  By construction the values of industry specialization index within a neighborhood 
are mechanically correlated (if neighborhood A is a relative specialist of industry X, it is 
less likely to be a specialist in industry Y). This could inflate the t-statistics we obtain. 
We use bootstrapping to adjust for the standard errors.  We re-sample the dependent 
variable for 10,000 times.  The sample drawn during each replication is a bootstrap 
sample of clusters by neighborhood. We report the bootstrapping adjusted standard 
                                                 
12 The choice is certainly arbitrary. One can always ask why top 600 communities, but not 599 or 601. But 
for the brevity of the presentation, we have to make a choice.   18
errors in brackets under Row (5).  We find that the correlation of residuals is not very 
serious because the unadjusted standard errors previously reported are only biased 
downward by very small magnitude.  
  We also address this problem by reporting standard errors robust to potential 
clustering of residuals by neighborhoods. This adjustment produces an upper bound of 
the standard errors. Certainly the residuals can cluster by industries as well. This 
however has much smaller impacts asymptotically. We have more than 600 
neighborhoods, and relative concentration of industry X in any one of them presumably 
should have minimal impact on the other neighborhoods. We cannot produce clustering-
robust standard errors in Tobit regressions, but only in OLS regressions. In Row (6) of 
Table 3, we report the OLS results with standard errors robust to potential clustering of 
residuals by neighborhoods, as well as un-adjusted standard errors. The results still hold 
strongly, and by comparing the adjusted and unadjusted standard errors, we find that 
the correlation of residuals within a neighborhood is actually minimal.   
The coefficients on the borough “industry specialization index” are significantly 
positive as well, which indicates that new entrepreneurs’ industry choices are also 
correlated with those of the established entrepreneurs in the same borough. We are 
however less confident in whether the correlation is due to social interaction or common 
product market factors. The magnitude of the coefficients on neighborhood “industry 
specialization index” is also a little bit smaller than those on borough “industry 
specialization index”. This however does not mean that agglomeration at borough level is 
more important, as we have to take into account the fact that standard deviation of 
“industry specialization index” at borough level is only half of that at neighborhood 
level.  
4.2. Testing For Alternative Hypotheses Using Special Sub-Groups of 
Entrepreneurs 
  In this sub-section, we use various sub-sample of entrepreneurs to test for 
alternative hypotheses that may also explain our findings. We implement this by   19
constructing industry specialization index with only a certain sub-group of new 
entrepreneurs, which is used to reflect aggregated choices of this sub-group of new 
entrepreneurs. The industry specialization index of established entrepreneurs, on the 
right hand side of the regression,  remains the same because it is used to proxy for 
contact availability. 
4.2.1. Sample of “Commuters” 
With  “Manski critique” in mind, a very natural question reader may ask is 
whether the correlation we find is the result of persistent and unobservable product 
market factors, which determine industry specializations of both the established 
entrepreneurs and the new entrepreneurs. We argue earlier that this is unlikely as we are 
examining the residential addresses rather than business addresses of entrepreneurs, and 
these two addresses are separate. In our sample, more than 80% of our entrepreneurs 
operate their businesses outside the residential neighborhoods where they live. However, 
it is still possible that our results are completely driven by the rest 20% who start 
business in their own residential neighborhoods.  
[insert Table 5 about here] 
In Row (1) of Table 5, we formally address this concern by estimating a same 
model but based on a sub-group of entrepreneurs who start businesses outside their 
residential neighborhoods.  In Row (2), we further exclude entrepreneurs who start their 
businesses in the same boroughs where they live.  The effects we find earlier are still 
found in these two sub-groups of entrepreneurs. This safely rule out the common product 
market factor concern, because it is hard to argue that entrepreneurs away from their 
boroughs are still subject to the same product market conditions as their residential 
neighbors.  
4.2.2. Tax-Advantage-Induced Incorporations 
There is concern that the tax reform in 2002 can cause the correlation we find.  
The Budget Plan of 2002 cut the starting rate of corporate tax by 1%, and for the first 
10,000 GBP of profit the tax rate is reduced from 10% to 0%.  Thus,  if a sole trader or 
a partnership changes its legal form to an incorporated company and pay dividends to   20
shareholders, it can benefit from this scheme. This can create some spurious correlation, 
if many of the newly incorporated companies have existed in a neighborhood for a long 
time (thus their industry choices are affected by the same set of unobservable variables 
that affects the existing companies). Critics attribute the unprecedented number of new 
incorporations in 2002-2003 to this tax reform. Our analysis in the footnote shows that 
tax-induced incorporations are not wide-spread
13. Nevertheless, to directly address this 
concern, we also run a regression for entrepreneurs who incorporated their companies 
before April 2002 (when this drastic tax cut became effective). Between 2000 and 2002, 
there were no changes to corporate tax rates, and thus we can argue that taxation-
induced incorporations are minimal. The results in Row (3) show that our results are not 
driven by the group of potentially taxation-driven incorporations. 
4.2.3. Sample of Founders 
There is also concern that the entry of entrepreneurs can be inflated simply by 
high turnover of directors. Some directors may join the businesses much later after 
incorporation and they are not entrepreneurs at all but experienced locals (from the 
same neighborhoods as the replaced directors) who get on board to help. In 
neighborhoods where an industry is overrepresented, you are more likely to find some 
neighboring friends who can help, i.e., the pool of talents are bigger, and thus either 
                                                 
13 For a company in our sample to incorporate for this incentive, it has to meet the following requirements. 
First, it has to be profitable, otherwise sole trader or partnership has better tax advantage as they can offset 
the loss against their personal income from other sources. The profit must also not be that high, as only the 
first 10,000 GBP of profit is eligible for tax relief.  Second, the companies must pay dividends, otherwise 
the shareholders do not materially benefit from the schemes. U.K. corporation tax is an annual tax, which 
means it must be passed annually by parliament; otherwise there is no authority to collect it. The 
uncertainty on whether the scheme will be reversed is very high, and a company incorporated for tax 
purpose should pay back dividends as soon as possible. Third, such companies should not include non-
shareholder directors. Generally, to prevent people from exploit this scheme, the taxman will require the 
dividends to be about equal to the salaries paid to directors, for businesses recently switch from other legal 
forms to corporations.  
In our sample, less than 10% of newly incorporated companies pay any dividends, and this percentage did 
not go up after April 2002. If many companies are incorporated  to exploit this tax advantage, we should 
observe sharp rise of newly incorporated companies paying dividends. The Longitudinal Labour Force 
Survey also provide counter-evidence to the tax-reform-induced-incorporations argument. Although there 
has strong increase of sole director (of limited companies) since Spring 2002,  this seems to be part of the 
general phenomenon of rise of entrepreneurship because we also see strong increase in freelancing and 
agency work.  Independent data from Inter Departmental Business Register, using VAT registration 
numbers, also show that the rise of self-employed  is a general trend not only present among incorporated 
companies. Thus it is hard to argue that taxation advantage provide a major incentive for incorporations.   21
higher turnover or building up of bigger board is more feasible. This could also create 
the correlation we found. In Row (4), we only include those directors who join the 
businesses within half a year since incorporation, and they are more likely to be 
entrepreneurs in a strict sense.  Our results still hold strongly.  
4.2.4. Young Entrepreneurs 
In Row (5), we include only young people who are under age 30 when they start 
their ventures. There are two competing hypotheses as to whether young entrepreneurs 
are more or less influenced by their neighbors. The “new generations” hypothesis 
suggests that they would be less influenced by their neighbors. Residents of some 
neighborhoods specialize in certain industries because they have the expertise in doing so 
for historical reasons (for instance, immigrations), and since then stick to these trades.  
Young entrepreneurs under the age of 30 are more likely to have grown up more 
integrated with the world outside their neighborhoods, learn new skills and new 
information, and should be able to do something different from what their parents do. 
“Role model” hypothesis suggests the opposite. Young people may be less mature to 
make their own carefully-thought-out decisions, and thus are more likely to be influenced 
by their neighbors. This is called role model effects (Wilson, 1987), in which the behavior 
of one individual in a neighborhood is influenced by the characteristics and earlier 
behaviors of older members of his social group. Our results suggest that young 
entrepreneurs are also influenced by the established entrepreneurs in their 
neighborhoods.  
4.2.5. Controlling For Board Size 
It is also likely that residents of some neighborhoods prefer bigger boards of 
directors for some industries. This would also create the correlation we find in the data, 
as it constantly creates more entry of entrepreneurs in some neighborhood-industry 
pairs.  We formally address this concern in Row (6) and (7) , where we only count as 
one observation if in a board there are multiple directors from the a same neighborhood 
or sharing a same full postcode respectively. These only exclude 15% of the 
entrepreneurs. Most directors who share a same neighborhood actually share a same   22
postcode.  They are more likely to be family members or very close neighbors, as a full 
postcode in London usually refer to one property or a very small group of dwellings.  
Our results are robust to this alternative measure of entrepreneurial population.  
 
5.  Establishing Causality by Identifying Detailed Mechanisms of 
Social Interactions  
In Section 3 and 4, we establish that industry composition in a neighborhood is 
usually very persistent over time. Correlation of industry choices between new and old 
generations of entrepreneurs in a same neighborhood, however, is not necessarily the 
result of social interactions. In order identify the roles of social interactions in such 
correlation of industry choices, we need to document the detailed channels through 
which social interactions impact industry choices. If we can show that the effects we 
found are stronger in neighborhoods where social interactions are more intensive, we will 
establish strong support to our story of social interactions. This approach is similar to 
Bertrand et al. (2000), where they measure “Contact Availability” and examine whether 
correlation of benefit claims are stronger when “contact availability” is stronger. 
Furthermore, the role of social interactions will also be supported if the effects are found 
stronger in industries where social interactions are more important. 
We do not have any data directly measuring the social interaction intensity at 
neighborhood level.  But we find two proxies for it, the first is related to ethnic 
composition of residents, and the second is related to housing structures. We are also 
able to use Ellison-Glaeser index to proxy for industries’ dependence on social 
interactions. 
5.1. Ethnic Fragmentation and Social Interactions 
Previous literature suggests that social interactions may be stratified along ethnic 
lines. Marsden (1988) using General Value Survey data, finds that the chance of 
observing a black-black friends tie is 4.2 times higher than that generated by pure 
random matching, given the relative proportions of the different racial and ethnic   23
categories in the population. If people interact more with neighbors sharing similar 
ethnic background, then we would expect residents in neighborhoods with more 
homogenous ethnic background to interact more. Conley and Topa (2002) also find that 
measure of ethnic distance seems to be the most salient dimension along which 
neighborhoods exhibit spatial correlation.  
We collect ethnic background data from UK Census 2001, which is the closest 
survey to our base year. We divide UK population into several major ethnic groups: (1) 
UK whites (British and Irish)  (2) Other whites (Europeans) including mixed  (3) South 
Asian (India, Pakistan, etc)  (4) Black  (5) Chinese  (6) Other.  Following commonly-
accepted practice, we measure the ethnic fragmentation of a neighborhood by the 
probability that two randomly drawn households belong to two different ethnic groups.   
In London, we find large variations of ethnic homogeneity across neighborhoods, 
from completely white-dominated ones, to neighborhoods not very different from a small 
United Nations. In a median neighborhood in terms of ethnic homogeneity, you have 
fifty percent chance of meeting people with different ethnic background than yours.   
Even in the top 10% neighborhoods in terms of ethnic homogeneity, a resident still has 
20% chance of randomly meeting a neighbor from different ethnic background.   
[insert Table 6 about here] 
In Column (1) of Table 6,  we run the same regression but also include as 
explanatory variables the ethnic fragmentation index as well as its interaction term with 
industry specialization index.  The interaction term enters significantly negative, which 
suggest that persistence of industry specializations is stronger in neighborhoods where 
ethnic composition is more homogenous.  
5.2. Housing Structure and Social Interactions 
  Social interactions can be determined by architecture structure of a 
neighborhood. Glaesser and Sacerdote (2000) examine the connection between housing 
structure and social interactions. They find that neighbors in large apartment buildings 
are more likely to be socially connected with one another, perhaps because distances 
between neighbors are shorter, and because public spaces (traditional squares, piazzas,   24
coffer shops, bars, etc) create interactions between persons who don’t have natural 
reasons to interact. This connection is not incompatible with the popular belief that 
neighbors in apartment buildings develop weaker ties. Although they do not develop 
very deep relationship with their neighbors as rural inhabitants do, they interact with a 
larger set of neighbors because such neighborhoods are more densely populated. In our 
context, what matters is how many neighbors you get to know, i.e., the scope of social 
interactions, but not how well you know them, because you only need to know someone 
a little bit  to know something about his industry.   
From UK 2001 Census data, we know the composition of accommodation type in 
each neighborhood. We create a urbanization index by measuring the log difference 
between the number of “Flat, maisonette or apartment” and the number of “Whole 
house or bungalow” in a neighborhood.  London neighborhoods are among the most 
urbanized ones in U.K.  However, within London, there is still a great deal of variations 
of urbanization across neighborhoods.  
We explore this variation to test for our hypothesis. In Column (2), we interact 
the urbanization index with industry specialization index of established entrepreneurs. 
We find that persistence of industry specializations is indeed stronger in neighborhoods 
where the number of  apartment buildings dominates that of detached houses. 
5.3. Entrepreneurial Density and Social Interactions with Entrepreneurs 
The  “quality” of social interactions is important a well. If there are very few 
entrepreneurs among residents of a neighborhood, a potential entrepreneur is still less 
likely to meet and know an established entrepreneur even when social interactions are 
very intensive. In these neighborhoods, industry choices of start-up entrepreneurs are less 
likely to be influenced by neighbors, because not many of them are entrepreneurs.  In 
Column (3), we interact entrepreneurial density of a neighborhood with industry 
specialization index of old generation of entrepreneurs. We find that persistence of 
industry specializations is indeed weaker in neighborhoods where people are less likely to 
meet an established entrepreneur.  
5.4. Agglomeration of industries and information flows   25
Presumably, start-up entrepreneurs imitate their established counterparts 
because they think they may benefit from information flows. As a result, we should 
expect such herding to be stronger in industries where information interactions look 
more important.  We cannot directly quantify which industries require more information 
interactions, although some previous research (e.g., Gordon and McCann 2000) make 
subjective judgments by employing a panel of experts to evaluate the dependence on 
social network for a small cross-section of industries.  We instead measure it based on 
outcomes. If based on residential addresses an industry’s entrepreneurs are historically 
agglomerated geographically, we define that information interactions are more important 
in this industry.  
With the methodology proposed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997, page 899), we 
create Ellison-Glaeser index (short as EG index) for industries in London. The EG index 
was originally used to measures how much a certain industry’s employment is 
agglomerated geographically,  controlling for the agglomeration of total employment in 
all industries,  as well as the industrial organization of the industry (i.e., how 
competitive the industry is). In other words, it measures,  to what extent the geographic 
distribution of employment deviate from randomness (“throwing darts toward a 
dartboard”).  In our context, the index however measures how much an industry’s 
entrepreneurs (not plants) are relatively agglomerated based on their residential 
addresses, controlling for industry size (in terms of entrepreneur population) and 
geographic agglomeration of the whole entrepreneur population.  
We present the indices in Table 1 for each of the top twenty industries. The unit 
of analysis Ellison and Glaeser (1997) use is state in the U.S, while ours is neighborhood 
in London, thus the absolute value of the indices are not comparable. Also, since we are 
measuring the concentration of entrepreneurs in terms of where they live (which is quite a 
“city-wide tradable goods”, we do not need to follow Ellison and Glaeser (1997) to restrict 
the sample to manufacturing industries. Among the top twenty industries, the most 
agglomerated industries are real estate activities industry and financial intermediation   26
industry. These industries act as intermediaries in business activities, and thus naturally 
depend on social interactions and extensive exchange of information.  The least 
agglomerated industries are other services industry, and retail trade industry. Rosenthal 
(2001) discuss why some industries are more agglomerated than others.  
In Column (4), we interact Ellison-Glaeser index with industry specialization 
index of established entrepreneurs. We find that persistence of geographic agglomeration 
is indeed stronger among these geographically agglomerated industries. This may suggest 
that geographic agglomeration is self-reinforcing.  
5.5. Industry Specialization Based on Business Addresses 
In Column (5), we formally address the question whether businesses set up in a 
neighborhood can also influence local resident’s industry choice, and whether this effect 
dominates the social interaction effect we find.  Residents living in a neighborhood will 
certainly get familiar with the businesses set up in their neighborhoods (which although 
may be operated by residents from other neighborhoods). Although the residents 
generally do not interact with these “immigrant” entrepreneurs as much as they interact 
with their residential neighbors, we still expect there exist some sort of interactions of 
information.  To formally address this concern, we also create industry specialization 
based on the business addresses of companies in our database. In Column (5), we control 
for this as well in our regression. Indeed, start-up entrepreneurs are also influenced by 
these “immigrant” entrepreneurs.  The effects however are in a much smaller order of 
magnitude. Thus our results suggest that entrepreneurs mainly imitate their residential 
neighbors, not businesses established in their residential neighborhoods.  
 
6. Testing for Agglomeration Economy Hypothesis 
6.1. Failure Rates and Neighbors’ Specialties 
  We are interested to know whether social interactions produce valuable 
information to new entrepreneurs and create agglomeration economies. If an 
entrepreneur who starts a business in his neighborhood’s specialized industry does fare   27
much better, this would suggest that the persistence of industry specialization we 
observe in the data are the results of wise economic considerations (e.g. agglomeration 
economies).  For instance, Dumais et al. (2002) shows that plants in industry centers are 
less likely to close, controlling for plant’s age and size. Even if these entrepreneurs do 
only equally better compared with others,  this will still be weak evidence in favor of 
agglomeration economies, if we assume that:  when a neighborhood is overrepresented in 
a certain industry, the match between talent and industry is worse because the 
distribution of industry talents are similar across neighborhoods.  Finally, if the failure 
rate is higher for them,  we would say that these entrepreneurs make their industry 
choices out of behavioral biases because their interactions with neighbors increase their 
overconfidence in the odd of successes in their neighborhoods’ specialized industries, 
which may even creates mismatch of talents across industries. 
  We collect data on a cohort of London entrepreneurs whose businesses got 
started during year 2000. There are more than 50,000 of them.  The first question we 
have to address is how to measure the performance of the start-ups.  A natural answer 
would be to measure their profitability. However, UK law exempts small and medium 
businesses from filing detailed Profit and Loss accounts to the Registrar of Companies 
House. Furthermore, those which did not survive the first year certainly did not report 
either. This will create large sample selection problems if we only examine those who 
report.   
To solve this problem, we find an alternative measure: the failures of start-ups. 
The database provides information on whether a company is still alive, which are 
available for each company without exception. Thus we are able to create a binary 
variable “failure” for each entrepreneur, based on the fate of the businesses he keeps. The 
reason why we only examine companies started in year 2000 is that from the database 
we only know whether a company is alive or not by now, but do not know the exact 
date when they started to cease trading. A safe decision is to include only companies 
started 4-5 years ago, as we believe that if a company started then would fail (because of 
lower quality), it should have failed now.  The reason we examine start-up companies is   28
also that we want to achieve better comparability and initial homogeneity across 
companies in our sample. 
  The failure rate for start-ups is very high.  Five years from incorporation, more 
than 40% of these entrepreneurs are not in active trading any more. Such high rate of 
exit is not unusual, but is consistent with comparable studies
14.  
  The model is specified as follows, with failures of entrepreneurs as (binary) 
dependent variable. 
Failure =  β1 [ Specialization Index (at neighborhood level) of established 
entrepreneurs ]  + β2 [Specialization Index (at borough level) of established 
entrepreneurs] + Individual entrepreneur characteristics + Industry dummies + 
neighborhood (or borough) dummies + Constant 
Based on a large cross-section of individual entrepreneurs, we estimate the model 
using Probit. As explanatory variables we use industry specialization index at both 
neighborhood and borough level, to examine whether entrepreneurs who choose to follow 
their neighbors’ industry choices benefit from information spillovers (which presumably 
will be evidenced by lower failure rate or at least equal failure rate), or entered the trade 
by over-optimism encouraged by neighbors (which presumably will be evidenced by 
higher failure rate). We include industry dummies to correct for the fact that companies 
in some industries are naturally more risky, and have higher odds of failures. We also 
include neighborhood dummies to control for lower quality of entrepreneurs in some 
neighborhoods as well as other unobservable factors.  Estimation of Probit regressions 
with fixed effects is known to be problematic when there is small number of observations 
for each fixed effect group. For this reason, we also use borough dummies to replace 
neighborhood dummies in alternative specifications because the numbers of 
entrepreneurs per borough are much higher.  
                                                 
14 Scarpetta et al. (2002) using OECD data show that, leaving profitability aside, only half of all startups 
survive more than three years. Landier and Thesmar (2004) documented the same pattern in France. Both 
Cooper et al. (1998) and Landier and Thesmar (2004) show that the over-optimism of entrepreneurs at the 
beginning contributes to such high failure rates.   29
We also control for entrepreneurs’ individual characteristics. We include the age 
of the entrepreneurs (when they started their businesses) to control for their experiences 
(more experienced ones are less likely to fail), their substantial shareholder status to 
control for agency problems (entrepreneurs with small shares may act like employees and 
prefer less risky projects), and their genders to control for differences of risk-aversion 
(females are more risk averse and may pick less risky projects).  The standard errors we 
report are also robust for potential clustering of residuals at firm level, as many firms 
have more than one entrepreneur from the same neighborhoods.   
[insert Table 7 about here] 
In Column (1) of Table 7, we control for neighborhood fixed effects, while in 
Column (2) we control for borough fixed effects. The results do not favor the 
agglomeration economy hypothesis, which should be reflected by a negative coefficient 
value of β1. Entrepreneurs starting businesses in their neighbors’ popular sectors do not 
have lower odds of failures. One reason we do not find imitators doing better could be 
that: When there are something wrong with a company, new directors from where this 
industry is overrepresented (and presumably who are equipped with better industry 
expertise according to agglomeration economy theory) may join as “fire fighters”, and 
this would offset the negative correlation between industry specialization and odds of 
failure. To address this concern we use a sub-group of entrepreneurs who were appointed 
as directors within half a year since the companies’ incorporations. They are more likely 
to be “founders” than “fire fighters”.  In Column (3) and (4), we run regressions for 
“founders” who incorporate their companies during year 2000, controlling for 
neighborhood and borough fixed effects respectively. We still do not find any significant 
relationship between specialization and failure rates. 
6.2. How to Interpret the Results 
Although entrepreneurs who enter their neighborhoods’ specialized industries do 
not enjoy lower failure rates, they do not do significantly worse either. If we assume that 
(1) industry talents are distributed similarly in populations of different neighborhoods;   30
and (2) entrepreneurs of lower quality (in terms of match of talents with industry) are 
also tempted into their neighborhoods’ popular industries as a result of social 
interactions, then the fact that the average failure rates do not significantly go up may 
suggest that agglomeration economies are working in the opposite direction to offset the 
negative effects. This indicates that social interactions promote entry in a neighborhood’s 
traditional specialty without causing higher failure rates. In the future, we can shed more 
light on this research question by controlling for observable quality of individual 
entrepreneurs. For instance, we can control for individual-specific characteristics by 
using a special sub-group of entrepreneurs who used to start more than two businesses in 
different industries. 
Overall, the results suggest that entry of new entrepreneurs caused by social 
interactions tend to reinforce agglomeration, while failures do not change the geographic 
concentration. This is in contrast to Dumais et al. (2002)’s study on the dynamic process 
of geographic concentration based on business addresses. Using U.S. manufacturing 
industries data, they show that location choices of new firms play a de-agglomerating 
role, whereas plant closures have tended to reinforce agglomeration.  The two findings 
however are not conflicting. When it comes to choosing locations to set up businesses, 
agglomeration always results in rising costs for new entrants due to limited supply of 
commercial sites, and entrepreneurs would have incentive to locate their businesses in 
new places. When it comes to making decisions merely regarding which industries to 
enter, however, entrepreneurs can choose any industries (e.g., industries that their 
neighbors specialize in) without competing for resources with neighbors, because there 
are no known constraints on how many people living in a residential neighborhood can 
enter certain industries, so long as they do not go to the same places.  
    
7. Conclusions 
Why do entrepreneurs from certain neighborhoods consistently dominate certain 
industries? In this paper, utilizing separations of home and business addresses, we find   31
evidences in support of social interactions’ impacts on entrepreneurs’ industry choices. 
Based on a cross-section of neighborhood-industry pairs, we find that, new entrepreneurs 
are more likely to enter their residential neighbors’ popular industries. This persistence of 
industry specialization is stronger in neighborhoods with more intensive social 
interactions, and stronger in industries which are more agglomerated geographically.   
This effect is not likely to be driven by product market factors, as we are examining the 
residential addresses but not business addresses of the entrepreneurs, and the two 
addresses are generally distant from each other. We are able to identify the causality 
because residential addresses only determine social interactions but do not directly affect 
industry choices. Finally, we admit that, by aggregating our data from individual level 
to neighborhood level, we remain somewhat agnostic as to the actual mechanism linking 
neighborhoods to individual outcomes. Alternative strategies, especially those that allow 
causal inferences to be drawn about particular channels and for broader populations, 
have the potential to increase our understanding of the impact of neighborhoods on 
individual outcomes.    32
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 Table 1 :  Top Twenty Industries in London 































  74. Other business activities   21.32 36.57 17.8  6.10  0.46
  70. Real estate activities   12.15 10.62 14.9  5.57  2.34
  98. Residents property management  11.45 3.47 48.1  0.22  1.26
  72. Computer and related activities  6.33 7.63 42.7  1.39  0.78
  93. Other service activities   6.2 3.05 14.8  6.21  0.09
  92. Recreational, cultural and 
sporting activities  
5.7 6.08 12.0 5.74  0.79
  51. Wholesale trade and commission 
trade 
4.91 3.15 11.9 7.54  0.81
  45. Construction   4.3 4.39 20.2  5.77  1.63
  52. Retail trade   3.72 3.75 12.9  6.44  0.31
  85. Health and social work   3.48 2.3 9.7  5.13  0.45
  65. Financial intermediation, except 
insurance and pension funding  
3.08 2.03 6.1 7.69  1.86
  55. Hotels and restaurants   2.53 3.45 11.4  6.93  0.64
  22. Publishing, printing and 
reproduction of recorded media  
2.18 1.1 8.9 7.76  0.52
  91. Activities of membership 
organizations not elsewhere classified 
1.5 2.28 6.6 7.34  0.52
  63. Supporting and auxiliary 
transport activities; activities of 
travel agencies  
1.47 0.93 11.5 7.74  0.43
  80. Education   1.34 1.54 12.4  4.94  0.42
  66. Insurance and pension funding, 
except compulsory social security  
1.1 0.42 5.5 9.10  1.50
  50. Sale, maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail 
sale of automotive fuel  
0.88 0.74 12.1 6.82  1.73
  36. Manufacture of furniture and 
not else classified 
0.59 0.3 9.2 8.36  0.62
  60. Land transport; transport via 
pipelines  
0.58 0.81 14.5 7.59  1.73
 
Notes: 
1.  This table provides summary descriptive of the top thirty industries in London 
sorted by their shares of entrepreneurs in London. SIC codes and industry names 
are shown in the first column.  
2.  The second column reports the industry share of established entrepreneurs in 
year 2000 while the third column the industry share of new entrepreneurs during 
the next four-year period. 
3.  In the forth column is the percentage of an industry’s entrepreneurs operating 
businesses in their own residential neighborhoods, while in the fifth column is the 
median distance between residential and businesses addresses of entrepreneurs.    36
4.  The sixth column reports the Ellison-Glaeser index for each industry, scaled by 
10
-3. Higher values of this index indicate higher geographic agglomeration of 
entrepreneurs.    37
Table 2 :  Specializations of the top thirty most entrepreneurial neighborhoods 
 
Neighborhoods  First Specialty  Second Specialty Third  Specialty 
     
Garden Suburb  Real Estate  Wholesale Trade  Financial Intermediation 
Edgware  Other Business Activities  Wholesale Trade  Retail Trade 
Frognal and Fitzjohns  Real Estate  Financial Intermediation Property  Management 
Knightsbridge and 
Belgravia 
Financial Intermediation  Real Estate  Insurance and pension 
Abbey Road  Real Estate  Financial Intermediation  Wholesale Trade 
Hampstead Town  Real Estate  Recreational and Cultural  Financial Intermediation 
Finchley Church End  Real Estate  Wholesale Trade  Manufacture 
Holland  Financial Intermediation  Real Estate  Supporting Transport 
Totteridge  Wholesale Trade  Real Estate  Manufacture 
Childs Hill  Real Estate  Wholesale Trade  Health and Social Work 
Village  Financial Intermediation  Insurance and pension  Education 
Swiss Cottage  Real Estate  Property Management Financial  Intermediation 
Hendon  Real Estate  Wholesale Trade  Manufacture 
Regent’s Park  Real Estate  Wholesale Trade  Financial Intermediation 
Golders Green  Real Estate  Wholesale Trade  Manufacture 
Queen’s Gate  Financial Intermediation  Insurance and pension  Hotels and Restaurants 
Stanmore Park  Real Estate  Wholesale Trade  Retail Trade 
Little Venice  Property Management  Recreational and Cultural  Supporting Transport 
Brompton  Financial Intermediation  Hotels and Restaurants  Retail Trade 
Highgate  Real Estate  Financial Intermediation Property  Management 
Belsize  Property Management  Real Estate Recreational  and  Cultural
Cockfosters  Wholesale Trade  Insurance and pension  Sales of Motor Vehicle  
Mill Hill  Wholesale Trade  Real Estate  Retail Trade 
Marylebone High 
Street 
Real Estate  Recreational and Cultural  Hotels and Restaurants 
West End  Real Estate  Financial Intermediation  Hotels and Restaurants 
Campden  Financial Intermediation  Insurance and pension  Supporting Transport 
Hyde Park  Hotels and Restaurants  Real Estate  Publishing and Printing 
Royal Hospital  Financial Intermediation  Insurance and pension  Real Estate 
Chislehurst  Insurance and pension  Sales of Motor Vehicle   Construction 
Hans Town  Insurance and pension  Financial Intermediation  Real Estate 
 
Note:  
This table reports the industry specializations of the top thirty most entrepreneurial 
neighborhoods in London. Neighborhood names are shown in the first column. In the 
second, third, and forth column we report the top three specialist industries of each 
neighborhood based on the “industry specialization index” we calculate.    38
 Table 3:  Persistence of industry specializations over time  
 
 
Dependent variable: industry specialization index of new entrepreneurs 
Unit of analysis: neighborhood-industry pair 
 









          
(1)  All 633 neighborhoods  0.053  1.220  0.00  37,980
   (0.014)***  (0.061)***     
          
(2) 0.058  1.182  0.00  36,000
 
Top 600 neighborhoods  
(0.015)*** (0.063)***    
          
(3) 0.236  0.725  0.03  18,357
 
Top thirty industries 
 (0.013)***  (0.028)***     
          
(4) 0.318  0.513  0.07  12,660
 
Top twenty industries 
(0.012)*** (0.023)***    
          
(5) 0.356  0.469  0.07  12,000
 (0.012)***  (0.022)***     
 
Top 20 Ind. / Top 600 
Neighborhoods 
 [0.023]***  [0.038]***     
    
Bootstrapping adjusted standard 
errors  are reported in brackets 
  
          
(6) 0.329  0.440  0.20  12,000
 (0.020)***  (0.031)***     
 
OLS, robust to 
clustering by 
neighborhoods [0.022]***  [0.036]***     
    
Standard errors robust to potential 
clustering of residuals at 





1. The regression is specified as follows and estimated with Tobit unless otherwise indicated:  
Specialization (at neighborhood level) of new entrepreneurs  
=  β1 [ Specialization (at neighborhood level) of established entrepreneurs ]  + β2 [Specialization 
(at borough level) of established entrepreneurs] + Constant 
2. The regressions are based on a cross section of neighborhood-industry pairs. On the left hand 
side is the neighborhood c’s specialization index in industry i of new entrepreneurs entering 
businesses between 2000 and 2004.  On the right hand side we have two independent variables 
regarding the industry specializations of established entrepreneurs in year 2000.  One variable is 
neighborhood c’s specialization index in industry i, while the other is borough b’s specialization in 
industry i, both are based on the established entrepreneurs in year 2000.  
3. We present results based on varied sub-samples, to address the problem that industry 
specializations are estimated with large errors when there are too few entrepreneurs in a certain 
neighborhood or in a certain industry. Our full sample is consisted of 633 neighborhoods and 60 
industries. Our main sample however is only consisted of 600 neighborhoods and 20 industries. 
This nevertheless does not affect our results. Top 600 neighborhoods already account fro 99% of 
the entrepreneurs, while top 20 industries account for 95%. Cut-off points for “top” 
neighborhoods and industries:  Top 30 industries:  >=595 entrepreneurs, Top 20 industries: 
>=1931 entrepreneurs, Top 600 neighborhoods: >=91 entrepreneurs.   39
4. In Row (5), bootstrapping (cluster by neighborhoods) adjusted standard errors are reported in 
brackets. 
5. In Row (6), regression is estimated by OLS, with un-adjusted standard errors reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors robust to clustering by neighborhoods are reported in brackets   40
Table 4:  Regression results for each of the top thirty industries respectively 
 
 
Dependent variable: industry specialization index of new entrepreneurs 
Unit of analysis: neighborhood-industry pair 
 
SIC 
code  Industry 
Number of 
entrepreneurs 














    
74 Biz  Services  70527 0.242  0.035 *** 124.16
70 Real  Estate  40184 0.862  0.036 *** 479.23
98 Prop.  Magt.  37860 0.540  0.059 *** 152.55
72 Computer  20929 0.343  0.029 *** 215.65
93 Services  20519 0.250  0.072 *** 13.89
92 Recreational  18858 0.546  0.034 *** 444.65
51 Wholesale  16248 0.366  0.062 *** 128.84
45 Construction  14222 0.542  0.037 *** 644.66
52 Retail  Trade  12305 0.406  0.058 *** 122.48
85 Health  11501 0.123  0.055 ** 38.36
65 Financial  10198 0.820  0.066 *** 225.53
55  Hotel & Res  8367 0.423  0.039 *** 147.72
22 Publishing  7215 0.202  0.071 *** 35.19
91 Mem.  Org.  4960 0.149  0.039 *** 81.21
63 Aux.  Tran.  4862 0.231  0.067 *** 40.44
80 Education  4445 0.198  0.050 *** 21.53
66 Insurance  3635 0.956  0.122 *** 134.69
50 Motor  Sales  2913 0.289  0.062 *** 162.43
36 Manufacturing  1959 0.303  0.139 ** 17.67
60 Land  Tran.  1931 0.322  0.040 *** 164.40
18 Apparel  1810 0.596  0.110 *** 135.24
67 Aux.  Finan.  1750 0.318  0.060 *** 148.69
64 Post.  Tele.  1704 0.055  0.036 12.03
28 Fab.  Metal  1415 0.322  0.201 35.73
15  Food & Bev.  862 -0.186  0.171 7.77
71 Rent  Mach.  842 0.023  0.084 2.06
73 R&D  750 -0.160  0.149 21.08
31 Ele.  Mach.  659 0.325  0.575 14.11
11 Petro.  597 0.453  0.164 *** 55.97
24 Chemical  595 0.414  0.457 1.4
 
Notes:  
1. The regressions are specified as follows and estimated with Tobit:  
Specialization (at neighborhood level) of new entrepreneurs  
=  β1 [ Specialization (at neighborhood level) of established entrepreneurs ]  + β2 [Specialization 
(at borough level) of established entrepreneurs] + Constant 
2. The regression in each row is based on a cross section of neighborhoods for an individual 
industry i. On the left hand side of the regression is the neighborhood c’s specialization index in 
industry i of new entrepreneurs entering businesses between 2000 and 2004.  On the right hand 
side we have two independent variables regarding the industry specializations of established 
entrepreneurs in year 2000.  One variable is neighborhood c’s specialization index in industry i,   41
while the other is borough b’s specialization in industry i, both are based on the established 
entrepreneurs in year 2000.  For the brevity of presentation, we do not report in the table the 
coefficients on “borough industry specialization index”. 
3. There are 600 neighborhoods in the sample. We run regressions for all the 60 industries but 
only report the results of the top thirty industries. We do not find significant results in the 
smaller industries. The SIC codes and abbreviation names for the industries are displayed in the 
first and second column. 
4.  *** indicates that the coefficients on “industry specialization index” is significantly different 
from zero at 1% level, ** denotes  5%, * denotes  10%   42
Table 5:  Testing for alternative hypotheses using special sub-samples 
 
 
Dependent variable: industry specialization index of new entrepreneurs 
Unit of analysis: neighborhood-industry pair 
 









          
(1)   0.370  0.492  0.06  12000 




     
(2) 0.393  0.476  0.05  12000 




     
(3)  Before 2002 tax reform  0.377  0.538  0.05  12000 
   (0.016)***  (0.030)***     
          
(4) Founders  only  0.365  0.447  0.06  12000 
   (0.013)***  (0.025)***     
          
(5)  Young People Only  0.386  0.696  0.01  12000 
   (0.054)***  (0.101)***     
          
(6) 0.354  0.469  0.08  12000 
 (0.011)***  (0.022)***     
 
Same-neighborhood 
directors count only 
once        
(7) 0.360  0.476  0.08  12000 
 (0.012)***  (0.022)***     
 
Same-postcode 
directors count only 
once        
          
 
Notes:  
1. The regression is specified as follows and estimated with Tobit:  
Specialization (at neighborhood level) of new entrepreneurs  
=  β1 [ Specialization (at neighborhood level) of established entrepreneurs ]  + β2 [Specialization 
(at borough level) of established entrepreneurs] + Constant 
2. The regressions are based on a cross section of neighborhood-industry pairs. On the left hand 
side is the neighborhood c’s specialization index in industry i of new entrepreneurs entering 
businesses between 2000 and 2004.  On the right hand side we have two independent variables 
regarding the industry specializations of established entrepreneurs in year 2000.  One variable is 
neighborhood c’s specialization index in industry i, while the other is borough b’s specialization in 
industry i, both are based on the established entrepreneurs in year 2000.  
3. We present results based on varied sub-samples, to test for alternative hypotheses. Our sample 
is consisted of 600 neighborhoods and 20 industries.  In Row (1) and Row (2), we exclude 
entrepreneurs who operate businesses in their own neighborhoods or boroughs respectively.  In 
Row (3), we only include entrepreneurs who enter businesses before the April 2002 tax reform. In 
Row (4), we only include entrepreneurs who join the businesses within half year after 
incorporation. In Row (5), we only include entrepreneurs under age 30. In Row (6) and Row (7), 
we only count as one entry for companies with multiple directors from the same neighborhood or 
the same full postcode block.   43
Table 6:  The mechanisms of social interactions 
 
Dependent variable: industry specialization index of new entrepreneurs 
Unit of analysis: neighborhood-industry pair 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
0.409 0.362 0.314 0.163 0.328 
(0.026)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.023)*** (0.013)*** 
“industry 
specialization”  at 
neighborhood level       
       
0.457 0.461 0.448 0.449 0.454 
(0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** 
“industry 
specialization”  at 
borough level       
          
0.056       ethnic 
fragmentation  (0.078)      
          
-0.118        
(0.050)**        
interacted with 
Specialization 
      
urbanization   -0.119     
   (0.026)***     
       
 0.044     
 (0.019)**     
interacted with 
Specialization 
     
  -0.016     entrepreneurial 
density    (0.003)***    
       
  0.012    
  (0.002)***    
interacted with 
Specialization 
     
       
EG index     -0.217   
     (0.022)***   
       
   0.159   
   (0.017)***   
interacted with 
Specialization 
     
    0.073 
    (0.009)*** 
industry 
specialization of 
business  addresses       
       
Pseudo R
2  0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 
observations  12000 12000 12000 12000 12000 
 
Notes:  
1. The regression is specified as follows and estimated with Tobit:  
Specialization (at neighborhood level) of new entrepreneurs  
=  β1 [ Specialization (at neighborhood level) of established entrepreneurs ]  + β2 [Specialization 
(at borough level) of established entrepreneurs] + β3 Proxy for Social Interaction Intensity +  β4 
Proxy for social interaction intensity X Industry Specialization Index + Constant 
2. The regressions are based on a cross section of neighborhood-industry pairs. On the left hand 
side is the neighborhood c’s specialization index in industry i of new entrepreneurs entering 
businesses between 2000 and 2004.  On the right hand side we have two independent variables 
regarding the industry specializations of established entrepreneurs in year 2000.  One variable is   44
neighborhood c’s specialization index in industry i, while the other is borough b’s specialization in 
industry i, both are based on the established entrepreneurs in year 2000.  
3.  In Column (1), we test whether persistence of industry specialization is stronger in 
neighborhoods with more homogeneous ethnic composition, by including on the right hand side of 
the regression the ethnic fragmentation index of a neighborhood as well as its interaction term 
with “industry specialization index” of the established entrepreneurs. In Column (2), we instead 
use housing structure as a proxy for intensity of social interactions. In Column (3), we test 
whether persistence is stronger in neighborhoods with higher entrepreneurial population density. 
In Column (4), we test whether persistence is stronger in industries which are more agglomerated 
geographically. In Column (5), we control for industry specialization based on business addresses.  
   45
Table 7:  Determinants of entrepreneurs’ failures.  
 
Dependent variable:  an entrepreneur’s failure 
Unit of analysis: entrepreneur 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Full Sample  Founders only 





      
Industry  Specialization  0.002 0.017 -0.020  0.028 
(at  neighborhood  level)  (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017) 
      
Industry  Specialization  -0.008 -0.035 0.033  -0.050 
(at  borough  level)  (0.031) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) 
      
Log  of  Ages  -0.445 -0.451 -0.702 -0.531 
  (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.037)*** (0.034)*** 
      
Substantial  Shareholder  0.450 0.452 0.827 0.407 
  (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.021)*** (0.018)*** 
      
Male  0.022 0.028 -0.015  0.026 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) 
      
Industry  Fixed-Effects  Y Y Y Y 
Location  Fixed-Effects  Y Y Y Y 
      
Pseudo R
2  0.102 0.083 0.150 0.078 
Obs.  49149 49171 35904 36405 
 
Notes:  
1. The regression is specified as follows and estimated with Probit:  
Failure =  β1 [ Specialization (at neighborhood level) of established entrepreneurs ]  + β2 
[Specialization (at borough level) of established entrepreneurs] + individual entrepreneur 
characteristics + industry dummies + neighborhood (or borough) dummies + Constant 
2. The regressions are based on a cross section of entrepreneurs who start their businesses during 
year 2000. On the left hand side is a binary variable with 1 indicating that the entrepreneur is 
out of business.  On the right hand side we have two independent variables regarding industry 
specializations of established entrepreneurs in year 2000, as well as entrepreneur’s individual 
characteristics.  Regarding industry specialization, one independent variable is neighborhood c’s 
specialization index in industry i, while the other is borough b’s specialization in industry i, both 
are based on the established entrepreneurs in year 200.  Individual characteristics include age, 
shareholder status and gender. 
3. In all regressions, we control for industry fixed-effects. In the meantime, in Column (1) and (3), 
we control for neighborhood fixed-effects, while in Column (2) and (4), we control for borough 
fixed-effects.  
4. Standard errors are robust for clustering of entrepreneurs around firms   46
 Figure 1:  Maps of Greater London and Inner London 
 
Borough boundaries (Greater London) 
 
Ward Boundaries (Inner London only) 
 
.  
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This frequency histogram shows the entrepreneurial population density in a cross section of 
neighborhoods in London. Entrepreneurial population density is defined as the percentage of 
current entrepreneurs in working age population as of year 2000.    48
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Based on new entrepreneurs between January 2000 and January 2004 
Notes:  
1. “Industry specialization index” is as defined in section 2. 3.  
2. These two density histograms show the distributions of “industry specialization index”  in a 
cross-section of neighborhood-industry pairs (top 20 industries in top 600 neighborhoods) 
3.  The upper histogram is based on established entrepreneurs in year 2000, while the bottom 
chart is based on new entrepreneurs who enter businesses in the next four years.  